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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH
(West Jordan City),
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
BRUCE S. ROBERTSON,

Case No. 930728-CA

Priority No. 2
Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
Appellant Bruce S. Robertson relies on his opening brief
and replies to Appellee's brief as follows.

STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The texts of the following statutes, rules and
constitutional provisions are contained in the Addendum:
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-703 (1953);
Former Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 (1953);
Former Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 (1987);
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 (1992);
Former Utah Code Ann. § 17-18-1 (1953);
Utah Code Ann. § 17-18-1 (1992);
Utah Code Ann. § 17-18-1.7 (1992);
Former Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.8 (1983);
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.8 (1993);
Former Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1215 (1977);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1302 (1992);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1304 (1991);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1308 (1991);
Article VIII, § 16, Constitution of Utah.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
A review of statutes involving prosecutions by cities
demonstrates that cities have not historically had the authority to
select any state misdemeanor and prosecute it in the name of the
State.

Instead, city prosecutors had the authority to prosecute

city ordinances.

City prosecutors had statutory authorization to

prosecute state code violations in only two narrow, specifically
delineated areas prior to the adoption of Article VIII, section 16
and have not historically had the ability to select any state
misdemeanor for prosecution, as was done in this case.
In addition, the clear constitutional mandate overrides any
legislative action.

In other words, even if the statute authorizes

a city prosecutor to charge state crimes, the constitutional mandate
precludes the primary exercise of such authority.
The city prosecutor exercised primary authority in this
case and under the scheme outlined by West Jordan City ("City11).
According to the City's argument, city prosecutors get first crack
at state misdemeanors and infractions.

The exercise of

prosecutorial discretion includes a decision not to prosecute as
well as a decision to file certain charges.

A decision by an

elected prosecutor not to file state charges can be overridden by a
city prosecutor under the City's scheme.

The broad discretion given

prosecutors and the potential for abuse requires that the mandate of
Article VIII, section 16 be followed, and an elected public
prosecutor be given primary authority for the prosecution of state
misdemeanors and infractions.
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ARGUMENT
POINT. PROSECUTION OF STATE MISDEMEANOR CHARGES
BY AN UNELECTED CITY PROSECUTOR VIOLATES
ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 16 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
Although "statutes are presumed to be constitutional"
(Salt Lake City v. Ohms, Case No. 930580 (Utah August 18, 1994),
amended slip op. at 4, quoting State v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786
P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1990)), "when a proper challenge to the
constitutionality of a given statute is made, the said statute must
be examined to determine if it is unconstitutional, either on its
face or as applied.

[citations omitted]." Ohms, amended slip op.

at 4.
While the City is correct that the burden of showing the
unconstitutionality of the statute is on Appellant, it is incorrect
that Appellant must establish that the statute is "unconstitutional
beyond a reasonable doubt."

See City's brief at 5-6.

Instead, the

standard was clearly stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Society of
Separationists v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 920 (Utah 1993) as
follows:

"The act is presumed valid, and we resolve any reasonable

doubts in favor of constitutionality.

[citations omitted]."

Article VIII, section 16 of the Utah Constitution controls
"the prosecution of criminal actions brought in the name of the
State of Utah" (emphasis added).

This constitutional provision does

not refer to or affect the prosecution of criminal actions based on
a violation of a city ordinance.

Appellant's argument is that the

instant prosecution which is brought by West Jordan City in the name
of the State of Utah violates Article VIII, section 16 of the Utah

Constitution.
Article VIII, section 16 was enacted and approved by the
voters in 1984 and became effective July 1, 1985.

See Compiler's

Notes following analysis at the beginning of Article VIII.
Article VIII contained no similar provisions.

Former

See Compiler's Notes

following Article VIII, section 16.
The City claims that cities "have had the statutory
authority to prosecute in the name of the State of Utah for nearly
twenty years."

City's brief at 7.

A review of legislation enacted

prior to the adoption of Article VIII, section 16 demonstrates that
this claim is incorrect.
In 1953, the legislature enacted Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-3-703
and 10-3-928. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-703 (1953) authorized cities to
pass municipal ordinances which are punishable as class B
misdemeanors or lower.1

1.

That statute remains in effect in its

Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-703 (1953) provides:
10-3-703. Penalty for violation of ordinance—
Civil penalty for unauthorized use of property—
Procedural rules.
Unless otherwise specifically authorized by
statute, the governing body of each municipality
may provide a penalty for the violation of any
municipal ordinance by a fine not to exceed the
maximum class B misdemeanor fine under Section
76-3-301 or by a term of imprisonment up to six
months, or by both the fine and term of
imprisonment. The governing body may prescribe a
minimum penalty for the violation of any
municipal ordinance and may impose a civil
penalty for the unauthorized use of municipal
property, including, but not limited to, the use
of parks, streets, and other public grounds or
equipment. Rules of civil procedure shall be
substantially followed.
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original version without any amendments.
The original version of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 gave city
attorneys the authority to prosecute violations of city ordinances.
The original version of Section 10-3-928 remained in effect until
1987, three years after Article VIII, section 16 was passed.

It

stated:
10-3-928. Attorney
The city attorney shall have the duty to
prosecute violations of city ordinances and shall
have the same powers in respect to violations of
city ordinances as may be exercised by a county
attorney in respect to violations of state law,
including, but not limited to, granting immunity
to witnesses for violations of city ordinances.
These two statutes demonstrate that at the time
Article VIII, section 16 was adopted, city attorneys with rare
exception prosecuted violations of city ordinances.

These

violations of city ordinances were punishable by fines and sentences
not to exceed that for class B misdemeanors.
Prior to the adoption of the constitutional provision, the
legislature gave the city the ability to prosecute violations of the
state code in only two specifically delineated areas.

Pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1215, enacted in 1977, cities had legislative
authority to prosecute pornography-related crimes outlined in
part 10 of Title 76.2

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.8

2. Allowing city attorneys to prosecute pornography-related crimes
may have been inspired by the requirement that the material offend
"contemporary community standards" and the 1977 Utah Supreme Court
decision holding that contemporary community standards are local
standards and do "not require the application of a statewide
standard." State v. International Amusements, 565 P.2d 1112, 1113
(Utah 1977), interpreting Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1201 (1953).
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(1983), enacted in 1983, city prosecutors had the authority to
prosecute certain state class B misdemeanor charges of driving on
suspension.

See Addendum A for text of former Utah Code Ann.

§ 41-6-44.8 (1983) and former Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1215 (1977).3
These are the only two areas where city prosecutors were allowed to
prosecute state crimes prior to the adoption of Article VIII,
section 16.
While city attorneys had been prosecuting pornographic
crimes for approximately seven years when the constitutional
provision was adopted, they had only been authorized to prosecute
state driving on suspension charges under the code for about one
year.4

Hence, a review of legislation in place at the time

Article VIII, section 16 was adopted demonstrates that cities were
not permitted to select any misdemeanor under the state code and
prosecute it.

Instead, city prosecutors were authorized to

prosecute violations of city ordinances and two specifically
delineated types of crime under the state code.
Following the adoption of Article VIII, section 16, the
legislature enacted two provisions which permitted city attorneys to
prosecute certain state class A misdemeanor charges.

Such

legislation included the amendment to Section 41-6-44.8 which allows

3. The legislature has revised this statute to include the role of
a district attorney.
4. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-703 (1953), cities were able
to pass city ordinances making driving on suspension as outlined in
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.8 (1983) a crime. Granting city attorneys
the authority to prosecute these driving on suspension charges in
the name of the State was unnecessary.
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a city to prosecute driving on revocation and driving under the
influence as class A misdemeanors where the defendant has been
convicted of a prior DUI or license charge.

Utah Code Ann.

§ 76-10-1308, enacted in 1991, authorizes city prosecutors to
prosecute subsequent solicitation charges as class A misdemeanors
where the defendant has a prior similar conviction.5
These post-1984 statutes also demonstrate that city
prosecutors have not traditionally had the ability to prosecute any
state misdemeanor.

Instead, the authorization to prosecute state

misdemeanors has been limited to specific crimes which are similar
to or based on enhancements from the types of crimes the cities
prosecute under city ordinances.
Finally, a review of Utah Code Ann. § 17-18-1 demonstrates
that city attorneys have not historically had the ability to select
any state misdemeanor and prosecute it.

The version of Section

17-18-1 in effect when Article VIII, section 16 was adopted stated:
17-18-1. Powers—Duties—Prohibitions.
The county attorney is a public prosecutor,
and must:
(1) Conduct on behalf of the state all
prosecutions for public offenses committed
within his county, except for misdemeanor
prosecutions under city or town ordinances
and appeals therefrom.
This statute demonstrates that at the time Article VIII,
section 16 was adopted, county attorneys were responsible for

5. The constitutionality of these other statutes authorizing the
city to prosecute in certain delineated areas is not before this
Court in this case. It should be noted that the existence of these
other statutes does not add weight to the City's argument in this
case. The legislature may well have passed additional
unconstitutional statutes.
- 7
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prosecuting all crimes except for misdemeanors based on violations
of city ordinances.
The above language of Utah Code Ann. § 17-18-1 remained in
effect until 1992 when the legislature amended the statute to except
prosecutions undertaken by city attorneys pursuant to Section
10-3-928, the statute at issue in this case.

That version of

Section 17-18-1 reads:
(1) The county attorney is a public
prosecutor and shall:
(a) conduct on behalf of the state all
prosecutions for public offenses committed
within the county, except for prosecutions
undertaken by the city attorney under
Section 10-3-928 and appeals therefrom.6
The 1992 amendment to Section 17-18-1 adds no support to
the City's argument.

It simply acknowledges the existence of

6. The following legislation has since been enacted to take into
account the creation of an office of district attorney. The current
version reads as follows:
17-18-1.7. Powers—Duties of district attorney—
Prohibitions•
(1) The district attorney is a public
prosecutor and shall:
(a) prosecute in the name of the state
all violations of criminal statutes of the
state;
(b) be a full-time county officer;
(c) conduct on behalf of the state all
prosecutions for public offenses committed
within the county, except for prosecutions
undertaken by the city attorney under
Section 10-3-928 and appeals from them; and
(d) institute proceedings before the
proper magistrate for the arrest of persons
charged with or reasonably suspected of any
violation of state law when in possession of
information that the offense has been
committed, and for that purpose shall attend
court in person or by deputy in cases of
arrest when required.
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Section 10-3-928 and the statutory authorization for such
prosecutions.

Prior to this amendment, the two statutes were

inconsistent and raised a statutory as well as constitutional
argument to prosecutions undertaken by a city attorney in the name
of the State.
Hence, a review of the statutory scheme both before and
after the adoption of Article VIII, section 16 demonstrates that
historically county attorneys have had the authority to prosecute
state misdemeanors and city attorneys have not been free to charge
state misdemeanors except in a few specifically delineated areas.
Furthermore, even if the legislature had provided for such
prosecution by city attorneys, such legislation would not be
constitutional in the face of Article VIII, section 16.

It is well

established that the legislature cannot override constitutional
mandates•
A historical review of the language of Section 10-3-928
also demonstrates that city attorneys did not have free rein to
charge state misdemeanors at the time the constitutional provision
was adopted.

The former version of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 which

was in effect at the time of the adoption of Article VIII,
section 16 gave city attorneys the power to prosecute violations of
city ordinances.

That statute did not allow city prosecutors to

prosecute violations of the state code.

See discussion supra at 6

regarding the original version of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 (1953).
In addition, the former version of Utah Code Ann.
§ 10-3-928 which was adopted in 1987 required that city attorneys be

- 9
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sworn as "deputy public prosecutors" in order to prosecute class A
misdemeanors in the name of the State.

The former version of

Section 10-3-928 stated:
10-3-928. Attorney duties—Deputy public
prosecutor.
(1) The city attorney may prosecute
violations of city ordinances and has the same
powers in respect to violations of city
ordinances as are exercised by a county attorney
in respect to violations of state law, including,
but not limited to, granting immunity to
witnesses for violations of city ordinances.
(2) The city attorney may be sworn as a
deputy public prosecutor by the attorney general,
the county attorney of the county in which the
city is situated, or any other public prosecutor
having jurisdiction within the city limits.
Appointments as deputy public prosecutor shall be
for a period of time as specified at the time of
oath taking but shall not exceed one year and
shall be subject to renewal. Upon such oath, the
city attorney may prosecute, in the name of the
state of Utah, any class A misdemeanor enumerated
as such by the Legislature and committed within
the territorial limits of the city.
This requirement that city attorneys be sworn as deputy
public prosecutors in order to prosecute state class A misdemeanors
complied with the requirements of Article VIII, section 16 because
the county attorney maintained primary authority over deputies.
It was not until 1992 that the current version of Section
10-3-928 went into effect. That version states:
10-3-928. Attorney duties—Deputy public
prosecutor.
In cities with a city attorney, the city
attorney may prosecute violations of city
ordinances, and under state law, infractions and
misdemeanors occurring within the boundaries of
the municipality and has the same powers in
respect to the violations as are exercised by a
county attorney or district attorney, including,
but not limited to, granting immunity to
witnesses. The city attorney shall represent the

- 10 -

interests of the state or the municipality in the
appeal of any matter prosecuted in any trial
court by the city attorney.
The wide range of discretion to prosecute state
misdemeanors which the City claims is authorized by this provision
is unprecedented.

Prior to this amendment of Section 10-3-928, no

statute even remotely suggested that city attorneys had the
authority to prosecute any state misdemeanor it selected.

Instead,

city attorneys were specifically authorized to prosecute only a few
state crimes.

The instant case appears to be the first case to be

heard on appeal which challenges the prosecution by a city attorney
of a state misdemeanor which is not explicitly authorized.
It is not clear from the amended language of Section
10-3-928 that the legislature intended to give city attorneys such
wide discretion to prosecute state crimes.

Instead, the amended

language of that statute could be read to authorize prosecution of
those state misdemeanors which are specifically delineated in other
parts of the Code and not to confer additional authorization to
prosecute.7
The City claims that the word "primary" in Article VIII,
section 16 implies that some entity has secondary authority to
prosecute in the name of the State and that the City is one such
entity.

Even if the language were interpreted in this fashion, the

7. While counsel for Appellant has been unable to find extensive
legislative history relating to the recent change in Section
10-3-298, it appears that the bill was tied into a concern regarding
the distribution of surcharges on criminal cases. See H.B. 436,
Gen. Sess. (1991) (comments by Senator Lyle W. Hillyard).
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scheme which the City claims is authorized by the current version of
Section 10-3-928 would give primary, not secondary authority to
cities to prosecute state misdemeanors.

In its brief, the City

states:
If at any time a city attorney fails to prosecute
an individual for an alleged violation then the
appropriate county or district attorney can
prosecute the alleged violations.
City's brief at 16. Under the City's interpretation, city
prosecutors would be given first crack at state misdemeanor and
infraction prosecutions.

The elected public prosecutor would get

involved only if the city prosecutor declined to prosecute.

This

approach is the opposite of that which is contemplated by
Article VIII, section 16.

That provision requires that the elected

prosecutor have primary or chief responsibility and not that it get
involved only where another prosecutor has declined to prosecute.
Webster's Dictionary lists a number of definitions for the
word "primary."

These include:

"first in time," that "from which

others are derived," "fundamental," "first in importance," "first in
order, quality and importance," or "direct."
2d ed. 1129 (1972).

Webster's Dictionary,

None of these definitions comport with the

scheme envisioned by the City whereby the City has first crack at
the prosecution.
In addition to disregarding the meaning of the term
"primary," the City's scheme fails to recognize that a decision by a
public prosecutor not to prosecute in the name of the State is as
much a function of prosecutorial authority or discretion as is a
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decision to prosecute.

In other words, where the public prosecutor

declines prosecution by the state of a class A misdemeanor, a city
prosecutor who does not have primary responsibility to prosecute in
the name of the State cannot constitutionally override that
decision.

In this case, there is no record of whether the county

attorney initially screened this case and declined to prosecute in
the name of the State or whether the City simply decided to elevate
the charges to a class A misdemeanor without ever presenting the
case to the county attorney.8
This transfer of authority to cities which the City claims
is permissible under Article VIII, section 16 also transfers the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion. In State v. Bell, 785 P.2d
390, 402-404 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court recognized the
broad discretion afforded prosecutors.

This discretion includes a

determination of "whether and in what manner to prosecute" and
encompasses a determination as to "whether or not to prosecute, what
charge should be made, and whether or not to dismiss, apply for
immunity or plea to a lesser offense."

Bell, 785 P.2d at 402, 404,

quoting State v. Grayer, 215 N.W.2d 859, 860-1 (Neb. 1974).

The

prosecutor's exercise of discretion is "absolute in our system of
criminal justice and "preserves the constitutional concept of
separation of powers."

Bell, 785 P.2d at 404.

The Utah Supreme Court has also recognized that courts have

8. The record does establish that the City initially charged
Robertson in the justice court with some infractions. The City then
dismissed the charges and refiled the case in circuit court. R. 170.
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on occasion scrutinized the prosecutor's broad discretionary power
and concluded "that the prosecutor's good faith is a fragile
protection for the accused."
(Utah 1986).

State v. Brickey, 7i4 P.2d 644, 647

Because the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is

absolute and subject to abuse, the requirement of Article VIII,
section 16 that public prosecutors be elected is especially
important.

An elected public prosecutor is accountable to the

electorate while still having the autonomy to exercise his or her
discretionary powers.

By contrast, an unelected prosecutor is

accountable only to his or her supervisors and not the electorate.
Allowing city prosecutors to charge state crimes could detract
significantly from the good faith exercise of prosecutorial
discretion and would grant powers to city attorneys which the Utah
Constitution precludes.
Finally, this prosecutorial responsibility mandated by
Article VIII, section 16 cannot be delegated by the legislature to
an unelected prosecutor.

In Salt Lake City v. Ohms, No. 930580

(Utah August 18, 1994) (amended slip op.) , the Utah Supreme Court
held that the legislature cannot delegate "core judicial functions"
to court commissioners and determined that "[p]ermitting the
legislature to grant court commissioners authority to enter final
judgment and impose sentence violates the separation of powers
doctrine."

Ohms, amended slip op. at 13.9

9,

In Ohms, the Court stated:
Core functions or powers of the various branches
of government are clearly nondelegable under the
(continued)
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A similar type of improper delegation occurred in this case
if the legislature did in fact grant city prosecutors the power to
prosecute state infractions and misdemeanors pursuant to Section
10-3-928.

CONCLUSION
Utah Code Ann.§ 10-3-928 (1992) is unconstitutional on its
face and as applied to Appellant in that its fails to give primary
responsibility for prosecution in the name of the State to an
elected public prosecutor.

Appellant/Defendant Bruce Robertson

respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial judge's
order denying Appellant's motion to dismiss and remand the case for
entry of an order of dismissal.

(footnote 9 continued)
Utah Constitution. See# e.g., Sandy City v.
Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 221 (Utah 1992)
(holding that legislative functions, such as
powers of zoning and rezoning, cannot be
delegated); State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683, 687
(Utah 1977) (holding that Utah Const, art. VI,
§ 1 limits legislature's ability to delegate
legislative powers or functions to others); In re
Bridwell, 25 Utah 2d 1, 2, 474 P.2d 116, 116
(Utah 1970) (holding that Utah Supreme Court
cannot delegate its duty to discipline an erring
attorney to others); accord State v. Green, 793
P.2d 912, 916 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (holding that
"crime definition and penalty powers are
essential legislative functions that cannot
constitutionally be delegated by the Utah
Legislature to any other person or body".
Ohms, amended slip op. at 5-6.
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ADDENDUM

TEXTS OF STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-703 (1953) provides:
10-3-703. Penalty for violation of ordinance—
Civil penalty for unauthorized use of property—
Procedural rules.
Unless otherwise specifically authorized by
statute, the governing body of each municipality
may provide a penalty for the violation of any
municipal ordinance by a fine not to exceed the
maximum class B misdemeanor fine under Section
76-3-301 or by a term of imprisonment up to six
months, or by both the fine and term of
imprisonment. The governing body may prescribe a
minimum penalty for the violation of any
municipal ordinance and may impose a civil
penalty for the unauthorized use of municipal
property, including, but not limited to, the use
of parks, streets, and other public grounds or
equipment. Rules of civil procedure shall be
substantially followed.
Former Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 (1953) provided:
10-3-928. Attorney
The city attorney shall have the duty to
prosecute violations of city ordinances and shall
have the same powers in respect to violations of
city ordinances as may be exercised by a county
attorney in respect to violations of state law,
including, but not limited to, granting immunity
to witnesses for violations of city ordinances.
Former Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 (1987) provided:
10-3-928. Attorney duties—Deputy public
prosecutor.
(1) The city attorney may prosecute
violations of city ordinances and has the same
powers in respect to violations of city
ordinances as are exercised by a county attorney
in respect to violations of state law, including,
but not limited to, granting immunity to
witnesses for violations of city ordinances.

(2) The city attorney may be sworn as a
deputy public prosecutor by the attorney general,
the county attorney of the county in which the
city is situated, or any other public prosecutor
having jurisdiction within the city limits.
Appointments as deputy public prosecutor shall be
for a period of time as specified at the time of
oath taking but shall not exceed one year and
shall be subject to renewal. Upon such oath, the
city attorney may prosecute, in the name of the
state of Utah, any class A misdemeanor enumerated
as such by the Legislature and committed within
the territorial limits of the city.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-928 (1992) provides:
10-3-928. Attorney duties—Deputy public
prosecutor.
In cities with a city attorney, the city
attorney may prosecute violations of city
ordinances, and under state law, infractions and
misdemeanors occurring within the boundaries of
the municipality and has the same powers in
respect to the violations as are exercised by a
county attorney or district attorney, including,
but not limited to, granting immunity to
witnesses. The city attorney shall represent the
interests of the state or the municipality in the
appeal of any matter prosecuted in any trial
court by the city attorney.
Former Utah Code Ann. § 17-18-1 (1953) provided:
17-18-1. Powers—Duties—Prohibitions.
The county attorney is a public prosecutor,
and must:
(1) Conduct on behalf of the state all
prosecutions for public offenses committed
within his county, except for misdemeanor
prosecutions under city or town ordinances
and appeals therefrom.

Utah Code Ann. § 17-18-1 (1992) provides:
17-18-1. Powers—Duties of county attorney—
Prohibitions.
(1) The county attorney is a public
prosecutor and shall:
(a) conduct on behalf of the state all
prosecutions for public offenses committed
within the county, except for prosecutions
undertaken by the city attorney under
Section 10-3-928 and appeals therefrom.
Utah Code Ann.. § 17-18-1.7 (1992) provides:
17-18-1.7. Powers—Duties of district attorney—
Prohibitions.
(1) The district attorney is a public
prosecutor and shall:
(a) prosecute in the name of the state
all violations of criminal statutes of the
state;
(b) be a full-time county officer;
(c) conduct on behalf of the state all
prosecutions for public offenses committed
within the county, except for prosecutions
undertaken by the city attorney under
Section 10-3-928 and appeals from them; and
(d) institute proceedings before the
proper magistrate for the arrest of persons
charged with or reasonably suspected of any
violation of state law when in possession of
information that the offense has been
committed, and for that purpose shall attend
court in person or by deputy in cases of
arrest when required.
Former Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.8 (1983) provided:
41-6-44.8. Municipal attorneys authorized to
prosecute for driving while license suspended or
revoked.
Alleged violations of section 41-2-28, which
consist of the person driving while his
operator's or chauffeur's license is suspended or
revoked for a violation of section 41-6-44, a
local ordinance which complies with the
requirements of section 41-6-43, section
41-6-44.10, section 76-5-207, or a criminal
prohibition that the person was charged with
violating as a result of a plea bargain after

having been originally charged with violating one
of more of those sections or ordinances, may be
prosecuted by attorneys of cities and towns as
well as by prosecutors who are empowered
elsewhere in this code to prosecute those alleged
violations.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.8 (1993) provides:
41-6-44.8. Municipal attorneys for specified
offenses may prosecute for certain DUI offenses
and driving while license suspended or revoked.
The following class A misdemeanors may be
prosecuted by attorneys of cities and towns, as
well as by prosecutors authorized elsewhere in
this code to prosecute these alleged violations:
(1) alleged class A misdemeanor
violations of Subsection 41-6-44(6)(a)(ii);
and
(2) alleged violations of Section
53-3-227, which consist of the person
operating a vehicle while his operator's
license is suspended or revoked for a
violation of Section 41-6-44, a local
ordinance which complies with the
requirements of Section 41-6-43, Section
41-6-44.10, Section 76-5-207, or a criminal
prohibition that the person was charged with
violating as a result of a plea bargain
after having been originally charged with
violating one or more of those sections or
ordinances.
Former Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1215 (1977) provided:
76-10-1215. Prosecution by county or city
attorney—Fines payable to county or city.
Prosecution for violation of any section of this
part, including a felony violation, shall be
brought by the county attorney of the county
where the violation occurs. If the violation
occurs, however, in a city of the first or second
class, prosecution may be brought by either the
county or city attorney, notwithstanding any
provision of law limiting the powers of city
attorneys. All fines imposed for the violation
of this part shall be paid to the county or city
of the prosecuting attorney, as the case may be.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1302 (1992) provides:
76-10-1302. Prostitution.
(1) A person is guilty of prostitution when:
(a) he engages in any sexual activity
with another person for a fee;
(b) is an inmate of a house of
prost itut i on; or
(c) loiters in or within view of any
public place for the purpose of being hired
to engage in sexual activity.
(2) Prostitution is a class B misdemeanor.
However, any person who is convicted a second
time, and on all subsequent convictions, under
this section or under a local ordinance adopted
in compliance with Section 76-10-1307 is guilty
of a class A misdemeanor, except as provided in
Section 76-10-1309.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1304 (1991) provides:
76-10-1304. Aiding prostitution.
(1) A person is guilty of aiding
prostitution if he:
(a) solicits a person to patronize a
prostitute;
(b) procures or attempts to procure a
prostitute for a patron;
(c) leases or otherwise permits a place
controlled by the actor, alone or in
association with another, to be used for
prostitution or the promotion of
prostitution; or
(d) solicits, receives, or agrees to
receive any benefit for doing any of the
acts prohibited by this subsection.
(2) Aiding prostitution is a class B
misdemeanor. However, a person who is convicted
a second time, and on all subsequent convictions,
under this section or under a local ordinance
adopted in compliance with Section 76-10-1307 is
guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1308 (1991) provides:
76-10-1308. Prosecution.
The following class A misdemeanors may be
prosecuted by attorneys of cities and towns, as
well as by prosecutors authorized elsewhere in
this code to prosecute these alleged violations:

(1) class A misdemeanor violations of
Section 76-10-1302; and
(2) class A misdemeanor violations of
Section 76-10-1304.
Article VIII, § 16 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
S e c . 1 6 . [Public prosecutors.]
The Legislature shall provide for a system
of public prosecutors who shall have primary
responsibility for the prosecution of criminal
actions brought in the name of the State of Utah
and shall perform such other duties as may be
provided by statute. Public prosecutors shall be
elected in a manner provided by statute, and
shall be admitted to practice law in Utah. If a
public prosecutor fails or refuses to prosecute,
the Supreme Court shall have power to appoint a
prosecutor pro tempore.

